Research
This page provides links to my published work, including my PhD thesis, and lists my work in progress.
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Most of my research focuses on causation and explanation. I am particularly interested in exploring how a scientifically and metaphysically respectable understanding of these notions can inform debates in philosophy of mind and philosophy of AI. I also have some research interests in philosophy of language and epistemology.
During the 2026-2029 period, I will be involved in two research projects funded by the Swedish Research Council:
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Natural Properties - a causation-first approach
with Jenn McDonald and Tom Wysocki
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​This project aims to uncover what makes properties natural by comparing the causal roles of stereotypically natural and stereotypically unnatural properties. Our working hypothesis is that naturalness is determined by causal role: a property like being a proton or a moose is less natural than being a proton because it plays a more limited causal role in the world, making it less suited for good explanations. Such a causation-first account of naturalness is reductive, nominalist-friendly, refrains from ruling properties out by fiat (such as extrinsic ones), delivers natural properties directly relevant to the special sciences, and accounts for the explanatory and predictive value of intuitively natural properties.
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How words mean: lessons from large language models
with Jessica Pepp (PI), Dimitri Coelho Mollo, and Pär Sundström
Given the right prompt, ChatGPT will output, “Ibuprofen can increase the risk of gastric ulcers”. The same output may be produced by a human doctor. It is natural to assume that these two outputs have the same meaning. But do they?
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This project has two aims. The first aim is to test the hypothesis that ChatGPT’s output is meaningful but has a meaning that differs from the doctor’s utterance. The second aim is to work from the assumption that the two outputs have the same meaning and develop a novel account of what makes this the case. Specifically, we will explore the hypothesis that ChatGPT expresses the same meanings that we express, though not because of any underlying mental states, but because ChatGPT has “quasi-mental states” that ground its meanings.
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​From August 2021 to December 2023, I was PI for the research project: Causation, Correlation and Sensitivity, funded by a Swedish Research Council international postdoc grant. This research was jointly hosted by Umeå University and Rutgers University. From February 2020 to July 2021, I was a post-doc on the DFG-funded Determinism, Control, and the Consequence Argument project at the University of Cologne.
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See my CV for more info, such as employment history, teaching experience, and presentations.
Published Work
Offical copies are available via the links, open access PhilArchive drafts can be accessed by clicking the title. Please cite the official copies when available. Feel free to contact me if you have difficulty accessing them.
2025
AI Mimicry and Human Dignity: Chatbot Use as a Violation of Self-Respect
Journal of Applied Philosophy
2024
Against Causal Arguments in Metaphysics
Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 1-13
2024
Mental Causation for Standard Dualists
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4): 978-998
2023
2022
AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy
Philosophy and Technology 35 (4) pp. 1-20
2022
Philosophical Studies 179, pp. 2823–2843
2022
And Therefore (with Alex Sandgren)
Inquiry: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
2021
Causal Exclusion without Causal Sufficiency
Synthese 198, pp. 10341–10353
2021
2016
Basic Beliefs and The Perceptual Learning Problem
Episteme (13), pp. 133-149
PhD Thesis
Causal After All: A Model of Mental Causation for Dualists
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Supervision: Pär Sundström (primary supervisor), Gunnar Björnsson, Torfinn Huvenes (2016-2019), and Andreas Stokke (2014-2016)
In the Fall of 2019, I attained my PhD at Umeå University.
In my dissertation, I defend the controversial thesis that a standard dualist ontology of mind can allow for mental causation even if all events have sufficient physical causes. That is to say, I argue that it is possible for dualist mental phenomena to non-overdeterministically cause behavior in worlds where the physical realm is complete. I also critically assess previous proposals to this extent.
The dissertation was shortlisted for the 2020 Mercier Prize for monographs in metaphysics and first philosophy, awarded jointly by the philosophy departments at KU Leuven and Université Catholique de Louvain.
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A full text is available via DiVa.
Hard copies are available upon request.
