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Research

Most of my research focuses on causation and explanation. I am particularly interested in exploring how a scientifically and metaphysically respectable understanding of these notions can inform debates in philosophy of mind and philosophy of AI. I also have some research interests in philosophy of language and epistemology.

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This page provides links to my written work and describes my ongoing and finished research projects.

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​​See my CV for more info, such as employment history, teaching experience, and presentations.

Published Work

Offical copies are available via the links, open access PhilArchive drafts can be accessed by clicking the title. Please cite the official copies when available. Feel free to contact me if you have difficulty accessing them.

Research Projects

​During the 2026-2029 period, I will be involved in two research projects funded by the Swedish Research Council:

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Natural Properties - a causation-first approach

with Jenn McDonald and Tom Wysocki

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​This project aims to uncover what makes properties natural by comparing the causal roles of stereotypically natural and stereotypically unnatural properties. Our working hypothesis is that naturalness is determined by causal role: a property like being a proton or a moose is less natural than being a proton because it plays a more limited causal role in the world, making it less suited for good explanations. Such a causation-first account of naturalness is reductive, nominalist-friendly, refrains from ruling properties out by fiat (such as extrinsic ones), delivers natural properties directly relevant to the special sciences, and accounts for the explanatory and predictive value of intuitively natural properties.

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How words mean: lessons from large language models

with Jessica Pepp (PI), Dimitri Coelho Mollo, and Pär Sundström
 

Given the right prompt, ChatGPT will output, “Ibuprofen can increase the risk of gastric ulcers”. The same output may be produced by a human doctor. It is natural to assume that these two outputs have the same meaning. But do they?

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This project has two aims. The first aim is to test the hypothesis that ChatGPT’s output is meaningful but has a meaning that differs from the doctor’s utterance. The second aim is to work from the assumption that the two outputs have the same meaning and develop a novel account of what makes this the case. Specifically, we will explore the hypothesis that ChatGPT expresses the same meanings that we express, though not because of any underlying mental states, but because ChatGPT has “quasi-mental states” that ground its meanings.

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Previous projects

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Causation, Correlation, and Insensitivity

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Most causal relations are insensitive: they do not break down under natural changes in the causal situation. For example, regardless of how smoking is caused, it correlates with lung cancer. By contrast, mere correlation is often sensitive: the correlation between cancer and yellowed teeth breaks down if the yellowness is not caused by smoking. The main thesis of this project is that different types of insensitivity can help to distinguish causation from types of spurious correlation that pose challenges for state-of-the-art accounts of causation.

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This project ran from August 2021 to December 2023 and was funded by a Swedish Research council international postdoc grant. The research was jointly hosted by Rutgers University and Umeå University.

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Determinism, Control, and the Consequence Argument

with Andreas Hütteman (PI) and Christian Loew
 

This project investigated whether control over our actions is compatible with determinism. If determinism is true, then the complete state of the world at any time in the distant past (even before we were born) together with the laws of nature completely fixes our current actions. Determinism, therefore, threatens our everyday conviction that we have control over our actions. The project argues that this apparent tension between determinism and control only arises if further assumptions about causation, laws, counterfactuals, and modality are added to determinism. Many of these added assumptions seem prima facie intuitively plausible. However, the project used empirical data (concerning both scientific results and scientific practice) as well as inductive methods to question these assumptions. Among other things, it will show that the so-called “Consequence Argument,” which many consider the strongest argument for the incompatibility of control and determinism, rests on empirically unfounded assumptions about alternative possibilities.

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I was employed on this project from March 2020 to July 2021. It was part of the DFG-funded Inductive Metaphysics research project.

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PhD Thesis

Causal After All: A Model of Mental Causation for Dualists

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Supervision: Pär Sundström (primary supervisor), Gunnar Björnsson, Torfinn Huvenes (2016-2019), and Andreas Stokke (2014-2016) 

In the Fall of 2019, I attained my PhD at Umeå University.

 

In my dissertation, I defend the controversial thesis that a standard dualist ontology of mind can allow for mental causation even if all events have sufficient physical causes. That is to say, I argue that it is possible for dualist mental phenomena to non-overdeterministically cause behavior in worlds where the physical realm is complete. I also critically assess previous proposals to this extent.

 

The dissertation was shortlisted for the 2020 Mercier Prize for monographs in metaphysics and first philosophy, awarded jointly by the philosophy departments at KU Leuven and Université Catholique de Louvain.

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A full text is available via DiVa.

Hard copies are available upon request.

Causal_After_All_Bram_Vaassen_CoverPage only.jpg

The excellent cover design by Tom Swaak

Work in Progress

[Drafts available upon request]

A paper on difference-making, arguing that it fails as a sufficient criterion for causation because it fails to incorporate insensitivity requirements.

A paper on grounding causal relations, arguing that proportionality-like considerations complicate the task of grounding causal facts.

A paper on the causal pairing argument, arguing that it poses no serious threat to current accounts of dualist mental causation (I've given up on this paper for now, but can still share it)

A paper on causation and impure sets, arguing that such sets pose a puzzle for mainstream theories of causation (with Torfinn Huvenes).

An overview paper on recent work on dualism and mental causation in philosophy of mind.

A paper on
 exclusion arguments in metaethics, arguing that these work no better there than in philosophy of mind (with Audrey Powers).

Another paper on exclusion arguments,
arguing against solutions which deny causal status to physical determiners.


[Drafts available in the near future]

A paper on contextualized versions of proportionality requirements.

Perhaps a paper on sexual orientation.

 

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